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INTRODUCTION
Without dignity, identity is erased. In its absence, men are
defined not by themselves, but by . . . the circumstances in
which they are forced to live.1
The lasting consequences of a criminal conviction can be “life-restricting
. . . varied, and often bewildering. [Moreover], they can impact the most
fundamental necessities of life—like a job, a place to live, and education.”2 The
effect of these “collateral consequences of incarceration”—those that “take
effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework”3—whether restrictions
from holding certain job positions or employment-related licenses; bars from
public housing; disqualification from student loan eligibility; or other
restrictions—is to promote the notion that the previously-convicted4 individual,
1. LAUREN HILLENBRAND, UNBROKEN: A WORLD WAR II STORY OF SURVIVAL,
RESILIENCE, AND REDEMPTION 183 (2010).
2. Ram Subramanian, Rebecka Moore & Sophia Gebreselassie, Relief in Sight? States
Rethink the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 2009-2014, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
CENTER ON SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 2 (2014), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/relief-in-sight-states-rethink-the-collateral-consequences-of-crimi
nal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy_downloads/states-rethink-collateral-consequences-reportv4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA77-H2JY].
3. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to
Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 497, 502 (2013)
[hereinafter Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name] (“The ‘collateral consequences’ of criminal
convictions are those that, rather than having been imposed upon the convicted individual by a
sentencing judge, ‘take effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework . . . by operation of
law [and are, therefore] not considered part of the practice or jurisprudence of sentencing.’”)
(quoting Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)).
4. I consider the term “ex-offender” to be pejorative and take heed the words of one formerlyincarcerated activist:
In an effort to assist our transition from prison to our communities as responsible citizens
and to create a more positive human image of ourselves, we are asking everyone to stop
using these negative terms [such as “inmates, convicts, prisoners and felons”] and to simply
refer to us as PEOPLE. People currently or formerly incarcerated, PEOPLE on parole,
PEOPLE recently released from prison, PEOPLE in prison, PEOPLE with criminal
convictions, but PEOPLE.
Eddie Ellis, An Open Letter to Our Friends on the Question of Language, CTR. FOR NU
LEADERSHIP ON URB. SOLUTIONS (Mar. 13, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58eb0
522e6f2e1dfce591dee/t/596e3ef9bf629a2270909252/1500397309561/Open+Letter+On+The+
Question+of+Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5ZC-5HWV]. Therefore, throughout this Article I
use terms such as “previously-convicted” and “formerly-incarcerated” to refer to those who bear
“ex-offender status” (I avoid the term “formerly-convicted” because I find it to be inaccurate). I
use the term “ex-offender status” to refer to the negative status of having been convicted of or
having pleaded guilty to a criminal offense, but will avoid using the term “ex-offender” when
referring to persons or classes of persons.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

EXTENDING “DIGNITY TAKINGS”

865

even after having served his sentence, is not, nor ever will be, equal to other
citizens. Thus, he will never be worthy of full participation in society or to
receive the benefits of its largess. This message often results in isolation, antisocial behavior, and increased recidivism.5
Individuals with criminal records bear the stigma of their ex-offender status
— a stigma that attaches to, damages and often destroys their reputations in both
the social and civic realms. This ex-offender stigma itself can be classed as a
collateral consequence of incarceration in that, like other collateral
consequences, it has “debilitating effects on the previously convicted person’s
ability to gain the necessities for daily living and to reintegrate himself into the
fabric of society.”6
In earlier work, I argued (1) that one’s reputation is a form of “status
property”7—property that is linked to identity; and (2) that the continued
attachment of stigma to ex-offender status, and the resultant damage to
reputation constitutes a regulatory taking of that “status property.”8
Conventional constitutional takings claims—including regulatory takings
claims9—require that the claimant identify three elements: (1) the property
involved; (2) the governmental conduct that has resulted in a taking of the
property identified; and (3) “the just compensation to which the claimant is
entitled.”10 This Article, however, posits that the type of reputational damage
suffered by those bearing ex-offender status can be conceptualized as other than
an unconstitutional regulatory taking of this status property. Rather, this
continued damage and stigmatization is also a taking of those individuals’
dignity. Thus, it can also be theorized as a “dignity taking.” This Article,
therefore, considers how the dignity takings analysis can be applied to
reputational damage caused by criminal history and ex-offender status.
Bernadette Atuahene originally developed the idea of the “dignity taking”
in the context of real property—specifically in the context of the systematic
taking of the land of Black South Africans by the apartheid regime.11 Atuahene
5. See generally SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND
REBUILD THEIR LIVES (2001); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND
PRISONER REENTRY (2009).
6. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 502.
7. Id. at 510–12; see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1714 (1993) (noting that “whiteness”—legal recognition as being racially “white”—is a form of
status property).
8. See generally Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 502–25.
9. “Regulatory takings,” as first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, occur when the government regulates the use of property in a
manner so as to constitute a constructive taking of that property. See 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
10. See John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “LibertyProperty,” 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 547 (2008).
11. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014) [hereinafter ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS].
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demonstrated that a dignity taking can be distinguished from a constitutional
taking with respect to the identity and status of the persons from whom the
property is taken.12 She originally defined dignity takings as having five
elements: when (1) a state directly or indirectly (2) destroys or confiscates
property (3) from owners or occupiers (4) whom it deems to be sub-persons (5)
without paying just compensation or without a legitimate public purpose.13 It is
the fourth of these five elements that distinguishes the dignity taking from the
constitutional taking.
The term “taking” has been used by legal scholars synonymously with the
term “constitutional taking.”14 However, a “taking” actually occurs any time “a
person, entity or state confiscates, destroys, or diminishes rights to property
without the informed consent of the rights holders.”15 This more expansive view
of takings allows for analyses that examine more than just the economic value
of the property taken, but rather extend to its emotional, social, political, and
cultural value.16 Additionally, this broader definition of the term “taking” invites
a sociolegal approach to these analyses that embraces the methodologies of
diverse fields such as psychology, anthropology, political science, and
geography, as well as traditionally-related fields such as law and economics.17
Atuahene describes the involuntary loss of property resulting from state action
as residing on a “takings spectrum,” with constitutional takings and dignity
takings on opposite ends and those instances of involuntary property loss that do
not quite fit within either definition at various points in the middle.18 This Article
explores the end of Atuahene’s takings spectrum on which dignity takings
reside.
Scholars have recently applied Atuahene’s analysis to find dignity takings
in varied circumstances, including the theft of Jewish and Gypsy property in
France and the Netherlands during World War II,19 Israel’s dispossession of the

12. Id. at 11, 40–56.
13. Id.
14. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination
of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene,
Takings as a Sociolegal Concept] (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 171–74.
17. Id. at 174.
18. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New
Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required,
41 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 796, 799, Figure 1.1 [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity
Restoration].
19. Wouter Veraart, Two Rounds of Postwar Restitution and Dignity Restoration in the
Netherlands and France, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 956, 956–59 (2016).
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Bedouins,20 the looting and burning of African-American property during and
after the Tulsa race riot of 1921,21 the separation of the Hopi people from their
sacred lands,22 and the forced evictions of Chinese peasants to make room for
rapidly expanding urban centers.23 In each of these contexts, the dignity takings
analysis was applied to circumstances in which real property (and some personal
property) was taken from the targeted groups.
After analyzing these other scholars’ applications of her dignity takings
framework in the aforementioned contexts, Atuahene revised her definition of
“dignity taking” as follows: “A dignity taking occurs when a state directly or
indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or occupiers and
the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.”24
Thus, a taking rises to the level of a “dignity taking” “when the state confiscates
property from groups that have been dehumanized or infantilized.”25 This
revised “dignity taking” definition has opened the door for scholars to
demonstrate that this framework can also be applied in instances where the
property taken is other than tangible property.26 Therefore, in considering how
the dignity takings analysis can be applied to reputational damage caused by
criminal history and ex-offender status, this Article argues that: (1) through the
continued attachment of stigma as ex-offender status and the myriad collateral
consequences attendant to that status, the state both directly and indirectly
destroys the reputation – a form of “status property” – of the previously
convicted; and (2) the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization
or infantilization. Thus, a “dignity taking” has occurred.
This Article’s analysis of dignity takings in the ex-offender context is part
of a trend toward the expansion of Atuahene’s paradigm. The first wave of

20. Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, Dignity Taking and Dispossession in Israel, 41 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 866, 866–67, 870–882 (2016).
21. Alfred L. Brophy, When More Than Property is Lost: The Dignitary Losses and Gains in
the Tulsa Riot of 1921, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 824, 824, 826–31 (2016).
22. Justin B. Richland, Dignity as (Self-) Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the Face of US
Dispossessions, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 917, 922–34 (2016).
23. Eva Pils, Resisting Dignity Takings in China, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 888, 889–94 (2016).
24. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 817.
25. Id.
26. Particularly relevant to this discussion is the work of scholars who have applied
Atuahene’s dignity takings analysis to criminal punishment. Their works, which will be discussed
in Part II of this Article, include: John Felipe Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity Following
Police Misconduct, 59 HOW. L.J. 621, 622, 625–31 (2016) [hereinafter Acevedo, Restoring
Community Dignity]; John Felipe Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the Criminal Law of 17th Century
England and the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 743, 765–67 (2018)
[hereinafter Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the Criminal Law]; Andrew S. Baer, Dignity Restoration
and the Chicago Police Torture Reparations Ordinance, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769, 776–92
(2018); Lua Kamal Yuille, Dignity Takings in Gangland’s Suburban Frontier, 92 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 793, 810–16 (2018).
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scholars to apply Atuahene’s dignity taking analysis did so in contexts wherein
tangible property (both real and personal) was taken from the targeted groups.27
A second wave of dignity takings scholars have looked outside of the real and
personal property contexts to find dignity takings in situations where tangible
property was not present, but state action caused dehumanizing and/or
infantilizing outcomes.
The most relevant of this second-wave scholarship to the analysis of
continued reputational damage caused by criminal history as a dignity taking is
that which focuses upon dignity takings in the criminal justice context.28 This
work represents a significant expansion of the dignity taking paradigm. These
scholars examine gang injunctions as dignity takings29 and the destruction of the
body in both the context of criminal punishment and police misconduct as a
dignity taking.30 As such, these scholars set the stage for conceptualizing other
forms of criminal punishment as dignity takings. Although these scholars have
expanded the dignity takings inquiry into the criminal justice space, they have
not explored the particular spaces of reentry or of reputational damage in the exoffender context. The continued reputational damage, stigmatization, and
collateral consequences suffered by the previously-convicted rises to the level
of a dignity taking because these individuals are both dehumanized and/or
infantilized. With this in mind, this Article further expands the dignity taking
concept into this area of criminal punishment.
Reconceptualizing the continued reputational damage caused by criminal
history and ex-offender status as a “dignity taking” mitigates some of the
difficulties posed by the constitutional taking analysis. In particular, the dignity
taking analysis allows one to focus on the social and psychological harms of the
taking rather than just the economic harms. Such a focus is, arguably, more
suited to the analysis of a “status property” taking since the economic value of
such property is not easily quantifiable. Thus, this focus on dignity-based harms
opens the door for “dignity restoration,” which though somewhat analogous to
“just compensation” in the constitutional taking context, may be other than
economic-based.31
This Article is the third in a series in which I explore the collateral
consequences of incarceration by applying takings analyses to the reputational
damage caused by criminal history. As such, it builds upon the foundation of
two earlier articles, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings Analysis to
27. See supra notes 19–23.
28. Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity, supra note 26; Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the
Criminal Law, supra note 26; Baer, supra note 26; Yuille, supra note 26.
29. Yuille, supra note 26.
30. Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity, supra note 26; Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the
Criminal Law, supra note 26; Baer, supra note 26.
31. See ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS, supra note 11, at 10–11 (noting that “dignity
restoration” may include other than economic remedies).
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Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History32 and A Second Chance:
Rebiograpy as “Just Compensation,”33 both of which apply a constitutional
takings analysis.
A Good Name establishes the reputations of previously-convicted persons
as “status property” which can be taken through government regulation and,
thus, is compensable.34 It reasons that the stigma of a criminal record functions
as a collateral consequence of conviction that attaches to “offender status” and
describes the negative effects of stigma attachment that are suffered by those
with criminal records35—negative effects that, in the aggregate amount to the
“dehumanization or infantilization” contemplated by Atuahene.36 It then applies
a regulatory takings analysis to the reputational damage suffered by the
previously convicted and articulates the idea of affording a “rebiography
right”—the right of one to “rewrite his or her history to make it more in line with
his or her present, reformed identity”37—as “just compensation” to the
previously convicted.38 Finally, it concludes by briefly examining the limits of
process in actually affording a rebiography right to reentering individuals and
weighing formal process (through courts and administrative agencies, for
example) against nonprocess (i.e., policies that prevent inquiries regarding an
individual’s criminal history).39
A Second Chance: Rebiograpy as “Just Compensation” seeks to further
demonstrate “that ‘just compensation’ is owed to the previously convicted and
that the way to provide it is through establishing a ‘rebiography right,’ stemming
from the taking of a constitutionally cognizable property right.”40 A Second
Chance applies the regulatory takings analysis used in A Good Name to actual
cases and uses statistics on the employment prospects and recidivism rates of
previously-convicted persons to argue that rebiography is necessary.41 Further,
it examines legislative and judicial options for rebiography.42
Part I of this Article revisits the concept of reputation as status property. In
doing so, it considers reputation as a resource that can be deployed to the benefit
of its owner and the impact of reputational damage upon individuals with exoffender status. Part II applies the first element of Atuahene’s revised dignity

32. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3.
33. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Second Chance: Rebiography as “Just Compensation,” 117 W.
VA. L. REV. 203, 204–30 (2014) [hereinafter Jefferson-Jones, A Second Chance].
34. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 501, 510–19, 526.
35. Id. at 502–07.
36. See Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 14, at 178.
37. MARUNA, supra note 5, at 164.
38. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 508–27.
39. Id. at 527–32.
40. Jefferson-Jones, A Second Chance, supra note 33, at 208.
41. Id. at 217–28.
42. Id. at 228–29.
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takings analysis to demonstrate that the State both directly and indirectly
destroys the reputational status property of those with ex-offender status. The
second element of the dignity taking analysis is applied in Part III by examining
the dehumanizing and/or infantilizing effects of collateral consequences and
post-release supervision.
Dignity takings and dignity restoration scholarship is a new area of inquiry
and is, therefore, still developing.43 Prior to Atuahene’s introducing the dignity
taking, “sociolegal scholars [had] not treated the intersecting deprivation of
property and dignity as an area worthy of systematic examination and
analysis.”44 This is particularly true in the context of the taking of intangible
property,45 especially where that taking intersects with the criminal justice
system. Thus, by extending the dignity taking analysis to the damage caused by
criminal history and ex-offender status, this Article adds to this new sociolegal
field.
I. REPUTATION AS STATUS PROPERTY/ REPUTATION AS RESOURCE
One’s reputation consists of the beliefs that others hold about him.46 Thus,
when individual beliefs about a person are considered collectively, reputation
functions as “a reflection of the community’s opinion of [an individual’s]
character.”47 Certain statuses can function as proxies for character, and thus
impact reputation. This is true with regard to ex-offender status. For instance,
even where the conviction in question is more than a decade old, ex-offender
status can be used as a proxy for character and reputation.48 Thus, the reputation
of one with ex-offender status can be permanently damaged by that status.
Classifying reputation as “status property” is consistent with the traditional
theoretical conceptions of property, from both the classical liberal perspective
of property as intertwined with liberty, and from modern views of property as
defining social relations.49 Reputation also bears the characteristics of property
with regard to expectations and functions, including the rights of, use and
43. Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 14, at 191.
44. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 797.
45. See Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 14, at 191 (“. . . further
investigation [of dignity takings] is necessary, especially in the areas of . . . intangible property
. . . .”).
46. See OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2d ed. 2010), http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/reputation [https://perma.cc/8DZ7-S8FG] (“Reputation” is defined as “[1] the
beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something: [e.g.,] his reputation was
tarnished by allegations that he had taken bribes; [2] a widespread belief that someone . . . has a
particular . . . characteristic.”).
47. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 499.
48. See A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v. S. Shore Bank of Chi., 962 F.Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (upholding defendant bank’s denial of loan to plaintiff under Small Business
Administration loan program).
49. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 510–16.
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enjoyment and the right to exclude.50 Because status property is linked to
identity, it functions as “a reputational interest that endows the owners with
certain privileges flowing from a public conception of their identity and
personhood,”51 and “can be both analogized to conventional forms of property
and literally converted to those forms.”52 Moreover, like other forms of property,
reputation can have “economic value as well as social, emotional, political and
cultural value.”53
This Part briefly revisits concepts regarding the property-like characteristics
of reputation. Most particularly, it focuses on (1) one’s right to use one’s
reputational status property; (2) reputation and expectations; and (3) reputational
status property as defining social relations and admitting the owner to civic and
societal privileges.
A.

One’s Right to Use Reputational Status Property

As status property, reputation can be “experienced and deployed as a
resource.”54 Thus, like other forms of property, the right to use one’s reputation
encompasses the three incidents of “use” identified by A.M. Honore, one of the
architects of the prevailing Hohfeld-Honore “bundle of rights analysis”55 that
dominates the traditional liberal view of property: (1) the right to use and enjoy
the thing owned; (2) the right to manage the manner in which it is used and by
whom it is used (including the right to exclude others from using the thing
owned); and (3) the right to benefit from the income of that use.56 The value of
the beneficial use of reputation has routinely been recognized by the law. One
of the more prevalent areas of this recognition is in the area of “goodwill.” In
addition to recognizing corporate goodwill generally, the law also recognizes
the value of “personal” goodwill where an individual’s reputation contributes to
the value of a business.57 This is akin to treating goodwill and its individual
reputational component as property.58
50. Id. at 514–19.
51. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2159 (2013) (citing Harris,
supra note 7, at 1734–37).
52. Id. at 2154 (2013).
53. Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept, supra note 14, at 172.
54. Harris, supra note 7, at 1734.
55. See J. E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712–
13 (1996) (describing the conflation of Wesley N. Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and A. M. Honore’s
incidents of ownership).
56. A. M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 116–17 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961).
57. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property
in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2005) (“Personal goodwill . . . is present
when the unique expertise, reputation or relationships of an individual give a business its intrinsic
value.”).
58. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 517.
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The right of beneficial use of one’s reputation is severely damaged in the
ex-offender context:
Those bearing ex-offender status . . . experience their status daily through the
imposition of the myriad collateral consequences effecting [the] most
meaningful aspects of their lives. They are barred, however, from rehabilitating
their reputations in a manner that would allow them to deploy them as a
beneficial resource. Thus . . . the potential value of this status property is
subverted in the ex-offender context.59

The collateral consequences of criminal conviction include, but are not limited
to “limitations and prohibitions on the franchise, and exclusions from public
benefits, public housing, loans and grants for higher education, occupational and
professional licenses and certain employment.”60 The dehumanizing and
infantilizing effects of these punishments, which take effect outside of the
traditional judicial sentencing function, are discussed more fully in Part III. In
addition to the collateral consequences imposed by legislatures and
administrative agencies, the stigma attached to ex-offender status functions as a
collateral consequence in that, like traditional collateral consequences of
criminal convictions, such stigma causes “debilitating effects on the previously
convicted person’s ability to gain the necessities for daily living and to
reintegrate herself into the fabric of society.”61 This subversion of the potential
value of reputational status property is not just the subversion of the ability to
use it in a beneficial manner, but also an undermining of the expectations bound
up with that use. Thus, one must examine the expectations that those with exoffender status have vis-à-vis their reputational status property.
B.

Reputation and Expectations

Cheryl Harris has noted that “expectations are part of the psychological
dimension of property.”62 In the context of regulatory constitutional takings, one
of the factors that the U.S. Supreme Court balances in determining whether a
taking has occurred is the “investment-backed expectations” of the owner.63
Although this Article examines reputational damage as a dignity taking rather
than as a constitutional taking, the example of “investment-backed expectations”
in this context is nonetheless instructive because it highlights the psychological
dimension of a property taking.

59. Id. at 518.
60. Id. at 502–03 (citing Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 585, 586–87 (2006)).
61. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 502.
62. Harris, supra note 7, at 1729 n.87 (citing STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY
30 (1990)).
63. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978).
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In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the owner of Grand
Central Terminal in Manhattan argued that the City of New York’s denial of a
permit allowing the owner to build a skyscraper atop the terminal was a
regulatory taking of its air rights.64 A regulatory taking occurs when “the
government has regulated the use of property in a manner so as to constitute a
constructive taking thereof.”65 Thus, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “The general rule is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.”66 The Penn Central Court, in an attempt to clarify what constitutes
the government’s “go[ing] too far,” determined that such an analysis should
focus on (1) the character of the regulation; (2) the extent of the law’s
interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
diminution in value of the property resulting from the regulation.67 The Court’s
reasoning reflected agreement with Frank Michelman’s notion that an owner’s
investment-backed expectations must be “distinctly perceived [and] sharply
crystallized.”68 Those with ex-offender status fit this criterion, as they have made
various investments in their own rehabilitation – whether through serving their
sentences69 or through also completing substance abuse, anger management, or
educational or vocational training while serving their sentences. Thus, their
“actual investment-backed expectations of [their] ability to reintegrate [into
society] upon reentry are certainly ‘distinctly perceived [and] sharply
crystalized.’”70 However, collateral consequences and the ongoing damage to
reputation suffered by those with ex-offender status frustrate these
expectations.71
In addition to use and expectations, the property-like characteristics of
reputation are colored by social context and societal constructs. The milieu in
which reputation is used and in which expectations of use and benefit are formed

64. Id. at 115–22.
65. Jefferson-Jones A Good Name, supra note 3, at 508.
66. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
67. 438 U.S. at 124.
68. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967); see also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. at 130 (finding no taking where owner merely believed it would have
the future ability to exploit its property interest, but had made no investment in or affirmative step
toward doing so).
69. This, of course, is if one agrees that criminal punishment is, in fact, rehabilitative. See
Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving from the “Cracked” Cocaine Debate
Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 95, 122–30 (2014)
(conducting a comprehensive examination of the purpose of criminal punishment, specifically drug
sentencing laws).
70. Jefferson-Jones, A Second Chance, supra note 33, at 214.
71. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 522–23.
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is the social context in which the owner operates.72 This is so for those with exoffender status. Thus, one must also examine the context in which reputation is
used and how this context particularly affects those with ex-offender status.
C. Reputational Status Property as Defining Social Relations and Admitting
the Owner to Societal Privileges
Evaluating reputational status property with regard to its social function is
in line with modern property theory.73 As Laura Underkuffler has noted,
“Property is under any conception, quintessentially and absolutely a social
institution. Every conception of property reflects . . . those choices that we—as
a society—have made.”74 In this manner, reputation is a form of social
currency—a medium of exchange between and among members of society.
In the social context, ex-offender status has followed an evolutionary
trajectory “from legal status to an aspect of identity.”75 In fact, ex-offender status
can be classified as a “master status”—an attribute that eclipses all other
attributes, positive and negative, of the carrier.”76 Because of the myriad
collateral consequences imposed upon those with ex-offender status, that status
“influences every other aspect of life, including personal identity.”77
Historically, information about one’s ex-offender status has been readily
available to those outside of the criminal justice system, including “prospective
employers, landlords and creditors.”78 This information is supplied via public
records searches and it has often been incumbent upon persons with ex-offender
status to disclose their criminal histories.79 Moreover, with the advent of the
Internet, curious private citizens have the ability to discover their neighbors’
criminal histories.80 This widely-available information results in “extending the
reach of the criminal justice system into the wider arenas of domestic and

72. LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 62–63
(2003).
73. See Harris, supra note 7, at 1728.
74. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 72, at 54.
75. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 510.
76. JOHN SCOTT & GORDON MARSHALL, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 455 (3d. ed. 2009)
(“The master status of an individual is one which, in most or all social situations, will overpower
or dominate all other statuses. . . . Master status influences every other aspect of life, including
personal identity. Since status is a social label and not a personal choice, the individual has little
control over his or her master status in any given social interaction.”); see also TODD R. CLEAR,
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 125 (2007) (“It is clear that being convicted of a crime and sent to prison
carries a stigma, and being a criminal can become a person’s master status.”).
77. Scott & Marshall, supra note 76, at 455.
78. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 58 (2007) [hereinafter PAGER, MARKED].
79. Id. at 34, 155.
80. Id. at 156.
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business affairs.”81 In this manner “[t]he status of ‘ex-offender’ is formalized
and legitimated by the imposition and dissemination of criminal records, which
are in turn used by employers and other gate keepers [such as landlords, loan
officers, and university admissions officers] in ways that restrict access to
valuable social resources.”82 Thus, “spoiled”83 or stigmatized reputation
functions as a “negative credential.”84 Indeed, as previously noted, reputation
itself is a resource—one that can be used to access other valuable social
resources or one that, when damaged, can be used by others to block that same
access.85 “In [the] . . . social context . . . ex-offender status . . . proscribes the
carrier’s social, economic, and civic relations. Because it is not naturally
ascribed, but rather attached through negative credentialing [through the courts
and through administrative processes], it fits squarely within modern
descriptions of property as a contingent creation of government entities and of
society.”86 This aspect of governmental creation is part of what makes continued
reputational damage caused by criminal history ripe for Atuahene’s dignity
taking analysis.
II. DIGNITY TAKING ELEMENT 1: “THE STATE HAS BOTH DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY DESTROYED THE STATUS PROPERTY OF PREVIOUSLY-CONVICTED
PERSONS”
Atuahene’s revised dignity taking definition can be broken down into two
constituent elements. Thus, “A dignity taking occurs when [1] a state directly or
indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or occupiers and
[2] the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or
infantilization.”87 This Part, in order to prove the first element, explores the
reputation-destroying effect of ex-offender status on reputation. It focuses on
two specific effects of damaged reputation in the context of those with exoffender status: (1) negative credentialing; and (2) one’s being de-propertied of
usable reputation as a result of ex-offender status.

81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 145.
83. See generally, ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 43–144 (1963).
84. See PAGER, MARKED, supra note 78, at 32 (“Negative credentials are those official
markers that restrict access and opportunity rather than enabling them.”) (emphasis in original); see
also Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 513.
85. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 513; see also PAGER, MARKED, supra
note 78, at 32 (“What the case of the criminal record brings into bold relief . . . is that the
credentialing of status positions can also take place in the opposite [negative] direction.”).
86. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 514 (citations omitted).
87. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 817.
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Negative Credentialing of Individuals with Ex-Offender Status

The imposition of criminal sanctions is a function of the State, via the
judiciary. In this manner, the triggering of most collateral consequences of
conviction—an adjudication of guilt—is the result of direct State action. This is
true whether the collateral consequence becomes effective automatically upon
conviction, as in the case of most sex offenses, or whether a state agency has the
discretion of imposing the consequence, as in the case of most professional
license restrictions.88 In either case, legislative and/or administrative arms of the
State directly impose the consequences—thus bestowing negative credentials—
outside of the judicial sentencing function.
The direct attachment of collateral consequences by governmental entities
engenders a persistent stigma that has the indirect result of encouraging private
actors (such as employers and landlords) to act adversely to the interests of those
with ex-offender status. These private actors often deny housing,89
employment,90 or other beneficial resources to those with ex-offender status,
rationalizing their actions as mirroring those of the State. In this way, the exoffender is de-propertied. As current scholarship has posited, this effect fits the
dignity taking paradigm.
Credentialing has become a fact of modern life: in order to get ahead, one
must pass muster with formal institutions that certify one’s educational
attainment or fitness and preparation to practice a profession or trade.91 By
formalizing status, this credentialing has resulted in increased social
stratification.92 While credentials are usually thought of as positively benefitting
their possessor, this is not so when the formally-imposed status is that of “exoffender.” In this instance, the credential bestowed is a “negative credential.”

88. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 589.400; MO. REV. STAT. § 314.200.
89. Guidance released in 2016 instructed that automatic denial of housing based on exoffender status is a violation of the Fair Housing Act. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING
ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL
ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (2016). Despite this guidance, fair housing advocates worry
about enforcement of this guidance. Recent lawsuits filed suggest the practice continues unabated.
Beatrice Dupuy, Georgia Police Suspend Program Allowing Landlords to Refuse Tenants with
Criminal Records, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/police-suspend-pro
gram-allowing-landlords-refuse-tenants-criminal-records-798784 [https://perma.cc/H88E-GZPZ].
90. See generally Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative Credentials: Fair and
Effective Consideration of Criminal Records, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 201 (2013) (showing although
EEOC guidelines suggest against blanket policies against hiring ex-offenders, many employers
effectively adopt policies banning any such hiring).
91. See generally RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 92–93 (1979).
92. Id. at 93.
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“Negative credentials are those official markers that restrict access and
opportunity.”93 Ex-offender status qualifies as such a credential. The official
bestowing of ex-offender status through the criminal justice system functions as
a “credentialing of stigma.”94 This stigma permanently attaches to the reputation
of the person bearing ex-offender status.95 Because reputation itself can be
classed as “status property,” and ex-offender status can be characterized as a
“negative credential,” “ongoing attachment of reputation marred by [the]
negative credential [of ex-offender status] represents one’s having been ‘depropertied’96 of beneficial reputation or the ability to rehabilitate poor reputation
post-incarceration.”97
B.

Negative Credentialing and De-Propertied Individuals with Ex-Offender
Status

Individuals who do not bear ex-offender status have reputational status to
use beneficially. This is how they actually get their desired job, house, and other
benefits. One might argue that the typical person with ex-offender status is
unlikely to have been someone who had a positive reputation prior to conviction,
so that person has not really lost anything, nor has he been put in a worse position
post-conviction and/or post-incarceration. However, if one is never able to
rehabilitate his status and therefore is never able to use his reputational status
property beneficially, the net result is that of actually taking away that property
permanently. Moreover, as previously noted, one of the foci of takings
analyses—whether constitutional takings or dignity takings—is the state action
involved in the taking. In the case of one with ex-offender status, even if his
original reputational status property was not sterling, it is state actors and state
action that is preventing its rehabilitation and, thus, its beneficial use.
As noted previously, private actors often take their cues from state actors
when determining how to treat those with ex-offender status. These private
actors, such as employers, landlords, school admissions officers, and other
gatekeepers, often inflate the risk of affording an opportunity to a person with
an ex-offender credential.98 This results in further entrenching the de-propertied
reputational status of those with ex-offender status. For example, one study
noted that, when supplied with information of the existence of a potential
employee’s criminal record, employers are reluctant to discuss that record with

93. PAGER, MARKED, supra note 78, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
94. Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617,
619–22 (2005).
95. See Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 514.
96. See Harris, supra note 7, at n.121 (discussing the effect of being “de-propertied” of
whiteness).
97. Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name, supra note 3, at 513.
98. See Hickox & Roehling, supra note 90, at 202, 256.
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the job applicant.99 This reluctance—whether due to discomfort, or a
misunderstanding of potential legal liability—“reduces opportunities to
contextualize a conviction or to demonstrate evidence of successful
rehabilitation.”100 Thus, the person with ex-offender status has no opportunity to
beneficially use his reputational status property and is, thus, de-propertied.
III. DIGNITY TAKING ELEMENT 2: “THE OUTCOME OF THE DESTRUCTION OF
THE STATUS PROPERTY OF PREVIOUSLY-CONVICTED PERSONS IS
DEHUMANIZATION AND/OR INFANTILIZATION”
Atuahene describes a “takings spectrum” with constitutional takings on one
end and dignity takings on the other.101 As she notes, “In the middle of the
takings spectrum are property confiscations that are not quite dignity takings and
also do not qualify as constitutional takings.”102 Such takings “do not rise to the
level of dehumanization or infantilization,” but rather are the result of
“humiliation, degradation, radical othering, unequal status, or discriminatory
actions.”103 It is necessary then to explain what makes the reputational status
property damage experienced by those with ex-offender status rise to the level
of a dignity taking, rather than occurring as a result of one of the actions in the
middle of the takings spectrum. As Acevedo has noted, “all punishment
conducts some form of dignity harm on the punished individual.”104 Therefore,
he concludes that it is necessary to determine when such criminal sanctions are
actual dignity takings.105 Acevedo finds that the dignity taking line is breached
“when a punishment crosses from humiliation to dehumanization or
infantilization of the criminal.”106 He concludes that actually destroying parts of
the body, such as when maiming occurs, crosses the line as an instance of
dehumanization.107 Likewise, punishments such as whippings infantilize the
punished individual and, thus, also cross the line into dignity takings.108 By
contrast, Acevedo found that shaming punishments, such as the use of “scarlet
letters” were mere humiliation and, therefore, occupied the middle of the takings
spectrum and did not rise to the level of a dignity taking.109

99. Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young
Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 201–
03 (2009).
100. Id. at 201.
101. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 799, Table 1.
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id.
104. Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the Criminal Law, supra note 26, at 9.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Acevedo, Dignity Takings in the Criminal Law, supra note 26, at 19.
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The continued reputational damage, stigmatization, and collateral
consequences suffered by the previously-convicted rises to the level of a dignity
taking because these individuals are dehumanized and infantilized.
Dehumanization occurs with the imposition of those collateral consequences
that deprive persons with ex-offender status of basic necessities such as shelter
and the means to procure it (i.e., lawful employment). Other collateral
consequences, such as restrictions on the franchise, along with measures such as
post-release supervision, work to infantilize those with ex-offender status. Both
legislative history and policy guidelines can be used as evidence of the
dehumanizing and/or infantilizing intent of these collateral consequences.
A.

Defining Dignity, Dehumanization, and Infantilization in the Ex-Offender
Context

Atuahene defines dignity as, “the notion that people have equal worth, which
gives them the right to live as autonomous beings not under the authority of
another.”110 She defines dehumanization as “the failure to recognize an
individual’s or group’s humanity.”111 Finally, she distinguishes between
“dehumanization” and “infantilization” as follows:
Infantilization is a dignity deprivation distinct from dehumanization because it
is predicated on a lack of autonomy rather than on a lack of human worth.
Infantilization is the restriction of an individual’s or group’s autonomy based on
the failure to recognize and respect their full capacity to reason. While the
person’s humanness may be acknowledged, his or her capacity for rational selfgovernance is not. Most commonly, infantilization involves treating adults as if
they were minors, and thus placing them under the authority of another, robbing
them of their autonomy.112

In the United States, the trend of the dehumanization of those with ex-offender
status has a nearly 50-year history. Acevedo charts that history noting that:
The dehumanization of people with criminal records arguably started in the
1970s, when the effects of the “War on Drugs” began to be really felt and the
militarization of the police (including the development of SWAT teams) took
off. President Nixon may have invented the criminal as cultural villain, but
President Reagan certainly perfected the image with his rhetoric against . . .
criminal “predators.” That rhetoric paid off in 1986 with the passage of the AntiDrug Abuse Act, which created mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine
distribution and even harsher sentences for crack-cocaine. . . . this was the
beginning of today’s mass incarceration problem: the United States has five

110. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 800–01.
111. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
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percent of the world’s population and twenty-five percent of the world’s
prisoners.113

The policies promulgated during the War on Drugs, were reinforced by incessant
media emphasis on stories of criminal activity and the rise of “true crime”-based
television entertainment.114 As a result, “Americans [began to] view criminals
as wholly without redeeming qualities . . . [and with the rise of] [c]riminalcatching . . . [as] a sport on shows like Cops . . . [to view] criminals . . . [as]
objects to be hunted” like animals.115 Thus, as individuals began reentering
society after serving predominantly War on Drugs-related sentences, the stage
had already been set for their continued dehumanization.
B.

Instances of Dehumanization and Infantilization of Previously-Convicted
Persons
1.

Collateral Consequences

As previously explained, the punishments imposed upon individuals, not as
a part of their official judge-mandated sentences, but instead imposed outside of
that framework by operation of law or administrative fiat are usually referred to
as the “collateral consequences of conviction,” or “collateral consequences” for
short.116 The term “collateral consequences” is the predominant nomenclature
for such punishment, however, I recognize that it is somewhat a misnomer.
Jeremy Travis has termed “collateral consequences” “invisible punishment”
instead.117 This term recognizes that these are not mere additional
“consequences” of a criminal record, but rather function as actual
“punishment.”118 Joshua Kaiser uses the term “hidden sentences” to describe not
just those non-judge-imposed punishments that haunt those with ex-offender
status, but also those that attach at arrest and that affect one while serving his
sentence.119 Moreover, Kaiser has argued that to label the civil disabilities and
other punishments faced by those with criminal histories as “collateral” is
misleading in that it implies that they are “‘incidental’ or of secondary
importance to the ‘real’ punishments” 120 imposed by the judge. Collateral
consequences are, however, far from being merely “incidental.”

113. Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity, supra note 26, at 630 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 630–31.
115. Id. at 631.
116. See generally Pinard & Thompson, supra note 60, at 586–93; Travis, supra note 3, at 16.
117. See Travis, supra note 3, at 15.
118. Id. at 16; see also Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add
Transparency, Legitimacy and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 123, 151–56 (2016).
119. Kaiser, supra note 118, at 127.
120. Id. at 144 (referencing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003)).
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As discussed in Part I, because the consequences of ex-offender status touch
every aspect of the previously-convicted individual’s life, this status can be
considered a “master status.”121 The Criminal Justice Section of the American
Bar Association and the National Institute of Justice have compiled all of the
codified collateral consequences across the United States into the National
Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (“NICCC”).122 The
NICCC database is currently hosted on the website of the Council of State
Governments Justice Center. Joshua Kaiser performed the first “systematic
analysis of the broad patterns in the NICCC.”123 This Article draws upon both
Kaiser’s analysis and the current NICCC updates in its discussion of collateral
consequences in the dignity takings context.
The NICCC groups collateral consequence laws into fourteen categories: (1)
business license and other property rights; (2) education; (3) employment; (4)
family/domestic rights; (5) government benefits; (6) government contracting
and program participation; (7) government loans and grants; (8) housing; (9)
judicial rights; (10) motor vehicle licensure; (11) occupational and professional
license and certification; (12) political and civic participation; (13) recreational
license, including firearms; and (14) registration, notification, and residency
restrictions.124 This analysis will focus on three broad categories: (1)
employment-related; (2) housing-related; and (3) political and civic
participation-related. Although these broad categories share ostensibly the same
names as those used in the NICCC, this analysis combines some of the original
categories. Thus, “employment-related” includes “employment,” as well as
“business licenses and other property rights,” “government contracting and
program participation,” and “occupational and professional license and
certification.” Likewise, “housing-related” includes “housing,” but also includes
“registration, notification, and residency restrictions.” These categories have
been combined because they are often overlapping with regard to their effect on
broad areas of the lives of reentering individuals. For example, restrictions on
business and occupational licenses can affect employment opportunities, just as
residency restrictions can affect housing options. Moreover, the NICCC “double
counts” certain restrictions by placing them in more than one category.125

121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
122. National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL STATE
GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/FN32-DX8U]
[hereinafter NICCC].
123. Kaiser, supra note 118, at 129.
124. See NICCC, supra note 122; see also Kaiser, supra note 118, at 132–33, Table 1.
125. See Kaiser, supra note 118, at 132–33 (“They [the NICCC categories] are not mutually
exclusive (e.g., bans from public office are limits on both employment and political
participation).”).
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Employment-Related Collateral Consequences

Kaiser notes that, as of July 2014, there were 42,634 collateral consequences
catalogued in the NICCC.126 As of May 2018, this number had increased to
48,229.127 Employment restrictions account for 54.3% of those restrictions.128
Business license restrictions account for 32.9%.129 Government contracting and
program participation accounts for 3.9%.130 Occupational and professional
license and certification restrictions comprise 34.8%.131 Once overlap and
double-counting are accounted for, employment-related restrictions comprise
74.9% of codified collateral consequences.132 These statistics indicate that
employment-related restrictions are by far the majority of the collateral
consequences imposed on those with ex-offender status. These restrictions range
from discretionary denials of medical licenses to both those with felony or
misdemeanor convictions,133 to automatic denials of plumbing licenses to those
with felony convictions.134
Employment is a gateway to stability: it is the means by which one may
obtain the resources to secure housing, which in turn is crucial in rebuilding
family cohesion for reentering individuals. Those with criminal convictions are
three to five times more likely to reoffend when they are unable to find work.135
Moreover, those on probation or parole are often required to work in order to
maintain their freedom.
Work itself is intrinsically dignity-affirming. Dignity of all work, regardless
of whether blue-collar or white-collar, whether paid or unpaid, whether
performed outside of the home or in the home, has been recognized by various
religious traditions.136 Moreover, increasing recognition has been given to the
psychological importance of not just work itself, but of dignity in the work

126. Id. at 133.
127. NICCC, supra note 122.
128. Id.
129. Id. This number may be inflated as it also contains “other property rights” and may, like
the other categories, include some overlaps.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. NICCC, supra note 120.
133. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540–X–3.05 (2008) (denying limited certificate of
qualification to practice).
134. See, e.g., 24 DEL. CODE § 1808 (2014) (instructing applicants for plumbing licenses with
felony convictions to apply for a waiver with The State Board of Plumbing, Heating, Air
Conditioning, Ventilation and Refrigeration Examiners).
135. Matthew C. Sonfield, Entrepreneurship and Prisoner Reentry: The Development of a
Concept, 35 SMALL BUS. INST. RES. REV. 193, 193 (2008).
136. See, e.g., U.S. COUNCIL OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The Dignity of Work and the Rights of
Workers, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/
the-dignity-of-work-and-the-rights-of-workers.cfm [https://perma.cc/AN9T-VFL2].
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environment.137 Thus, given the place that work holds in the psyche and in
society, denials of the ability to work, and to avail oneself of the benefits of
work, are examples of the dehumanization of those with criminal histories.
b.

Housing-Related Collateral Consequences

Housing restrictions account for 2.6% of the 48,229 collateral consequences
in the NICCC.138 Registration, notification, and residency restrictions account
for an additional 7.5%.139 Once overlap is accounted for, housing-related
restrictions comprise 8.1% of collateral consequences in the NICCC.140 Housing
restrictions range from such measures as discretionary denial of public housing
benefits to those with misdemeanor or felony convictions,141 to ineligibility for
protection from discriminatory housing practices.142
Although the percentage of housing-related restrictions is relatively small,
when compared to employment-related restrictions, for example, the importance
of securing adequate housing should not be underestimated. As mentioned
above, the ability to garner housing is essential to those seeking to rebuild postconviction family cohesion, especially in instances where the previously
convicted person is seeking to gain or regain custody of his or her children.143
Moreover, there is an explicit and recognized connection between housing and
dignity. For example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant on Political Rights all recognize the right to adequate
housing for all people, and thus, that one’s human worth and dignity are closely
related to one’s ability to secure adequate housing.144

137. See generally RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT WORK (2001) (arguing for dignity
recognition in the workplace and tasking employers with ending managerial abuse and
mismanagement).
138. NICCC, supra note 122.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:501 (2014) (giving housing authorities ability to find those
who have exhibited criminal behavior unsuitable for occupancy).
142. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 21–60–15 (2018) (applying to those with controlled
substance convictions).
143. Lara Bazelon, Redemption for Offenders and Victims, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 17,
2018), http://prospect.org/article/redemption-offenders-and-victims [https://perma.cc/7BJY-SA
ES].
144. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 25(1)
(“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and his family, including . . . housing . . . .”); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), art. 11(1) (“The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate . . . housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”);
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966), art.
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Housing restrictions have an especially deleterious effect on those with sexoffense convictions. This special category of previously-convicted individuals
is so severely restricted regarding where they may reside that entire colonies of
these individuals have resorted to living in makeshift camps under causeways145
and on train tracks.146 It is not difficult to see how dignity is impacted by such
restrictions.
c.

Political and Civic Participation-Related Collateral Consequences

Restrictions on political and civic participation account for 11.7% of the
collateral consequences listed in the NICCC database.147 The most widelyinstituted restrictions are those that bar individuals with ex-offender status from
voting.148 However, voting restrictions are not the only civic participationrelated collateral consequences: states also bar those with ex-offender status
from serving on juries,149 or holding elected150 or appointed public offices.151
These restrictions are clear examples of infantilization. Like minors, these adult
members of society are denied the autonomy that comes with participation in the
body politic. Instead, other members of society are charged with administering
the government and its policies without their input, thus “placing them under the
authority of another.” 152
2.

Post-Release Supervision

In addition to the collateral consequences of conviction, many reentering
individuals are also subject to some form of post-release or community
supervision, whether probation or parole. For example, at the end of 2015, one
in fifty-three adults in the United States was subject to such supervision.153

12(1) (“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right
to . . . freedom to choose his residence.”).
145. Isaiah Thompson, Swept Under the Bridge, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Mar. 8, 2007),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/swept-under-the-bridge-6334676 [https://perma.cc/CDB7RW9H].
146. Terrence McCoy, Miami Sex Offenders Live on Train Tracks Thanks to Draconian
Restrictions, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/news/mi
ami-sex-offenders-live-on-train-tracks-thanks-to-draconian-restrictions-6353588 [https://perma.cc
/SH8S-GQ9L].
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
149. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 47.
150. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §1021.
151. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-3109 (2018) (those with felony convictions ineligible to serve
as flood control district commissioner).
152. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 801.
153. Danielle Kaeble & Thomas P. Bouczar, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2015,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/HWD3-95SD].
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Incarceration is purposeful infantilization: the State is saying, “you broke the
social contract and now must be treated like a child” (i.e., loss of autonomy). In
other words, one of the punishments for breaking the law, and thus the social
contract, is the loss of autonomy. While we may quibble with the
appropriateness of this response, the State’s motivation is clear. Post-release
supervision is a purposeful extension of this incarcerative infantilization. The
infantilization of the reentering person does not appear to recognize the
restorative or rehabilitative purposes of criminal punishment, rather it seems to
be rooted in retribution and incapacitation. It, therefore, is arguably both
infantilizing in its effect, and dehumanizing in its purpose and raison-d’être.
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article has focused on dignity deprivations rooted in dehumanization
and infantilization of individuals with ex-offender status, but Atuahene has also
noted that “individuals and communities are deprived of dignity when subject to
dehumanization, infantilization, or community destruction.”154 Thus, it is likely
that a dignity taking can be evidenced by examining the destabilizing and
destructive effects that individual reputational degradation has on the
communities from which those with ex-offender status come, and to which they
often return. Applying the dignity takings analysis in the individual context sets
a foundation upon which to examine dignity takings in the community context.
The communities from which those with ex-offender status come and to
which they return, along with the individual members of those communities who
do not bear ex-offender status suffer from “courtesy stigma”155 – a stigma that
attaches to those associated with the person who bears the primary stigma. The
latest scholarship regarding dignity takings of collective property bears out the
existence and the effect of such “courtesy stigma” in the dignity takings
context.156 This scholarship, however, focuses on the total physical loss and/or
physical destruction of neighborhoods or community spaces. Future inquiry
must also examine community degradation and destruction in the instance where

154. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 18, at 801 (emphasis
added).
155. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 31
(1963).
156. This scholarship includes: Stephen Engel & Timothy Lyle, Fucking with Dignity: Public
Sex, Queer Intimate Kinship, and How the AIDS Epidemic Bathhouse Closures Constituted a
Dignity Taking, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 961 (2018); Thomas Joo, Alien, Land, Law: Urban Renewal
and Sacramento’s Lost Japantown, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1005 (2018); Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The
Good State Giveth and Taketh Away: Race, Class, and Urban Hospital Closings, 92 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1037 (2018); and Matthew P. Shaw, Creating the Urban Educational Desert Through School
Closures and Dignity Taking, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1087 (2018).
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the community is still there physically, but is nonetheless severely damaged
psychologically, economically, or otherwise.157
In addition to examining community destruction, future research must
examine “dignity restoration” in the ex-offender context. Atuahene has asserted
that “a comprehensive remedy for dignity takings entails . . . dignity restoration
—compensation that addresses both the economic harms and the dignity
deprivations involved.”158 Thus, future research should inquire into the types of
restoration that will actually provide proper “dignity restoration” to those with
ex-offender status. As such, it should revisit “rebiography” in the context of
“dignity restoration” and also explore other modes of restoration, including
community reparations. Such inquiry should both apply the theory of dignity
takings and utilize qualitative methods, such as semi-structured interviews, to
answer the question: What is the best form of “dignity restoration” for the
“dignity taking” suffered by those with ex-offender status?
The initial extension of the dignity taking analysis contained in this Article
sets the stage for these further modes of inquiry by demonstrating the ways in
which the imposition of collateral consequences and continued stigmatization of
those with ex-offender status fits the dignity taking rubric. Moreover, it adds to
this new field of sociolegal inquiry by further extending it into the realm of Statesponsored intangible property deprivations and their intersection with issues of
dignity and human worth.

157. My forthcoming article addresses these issues of community destruction as a dignity
taking in the context of the communities from which those with ex-offender status come and to
which they return. See Jamila Jefferson-Jones, “Community Dignity Takings”: Dehumanization
and Infantilization of Communities Resulting from the War on Drugs, 66 KAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
158. ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS, supra note 11, at 10–11.

